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We propose a generic oligopsony-oligopoly model to study bank behavior under uncer-
tainty in developing countries. We derive a pricing structure that acknowledges market 
power in both the deposit and loan markets and identify two theoretical components to the 
loan rate: a rent extraction component resulting from the interaction between the choke 
price of loans and prevailing banking structures, and a markup on deposit funding costs 
that captures the transformation efficiency of financial intermediation. We then test our 
structural specification with longitudinal data for 103 non-OECD countries and find that 
both the market structure under uncertainty and the deposit rate matter significantly in pric-
ing. However, the role played by the rent-extraction share in pricing, on average, domi-
nates funding costs in developing countries, and so underscores the importance of market 
structure in banks‟ pricing power. 
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1  Introduction 
 
The input-output approach in financial intermediation theory, which sees banks as inter-
mediaries that transform deposits into loans, has received considerable attention in the 
banking literature. It was first formalized by Klein (1971), followed by Sealey and Lindley 
(1977), and later served as the basis for numerous studies on banks‟ market power (See e.g. 
Zarruk, 1989 and Molnar, 2008). In this literature, banks are financial institutions that in-
termediate funds between two different markets - the deposit and loan markets. In doing 
so, they collect and process valuable information about clients and thus reduce the infor-
mation asymmetry between lenders and borrowers while gaining the right to market power 
entitlements.  
In most OECD countries, the presence of deep and active financial markets fuels 
disintermediation and intensifies competition in the provision of financial services. Tradi-
tional  banking  is  transformed  into  a  universal  and  complex  business  providing  retail, 
commercial, investment and insurance services.
1 These developments are highlighted in 
developed countries and are difficult to reconcile with traditional theories of financial in-
termediation, but they remain quite muted in developing nations where capital markets are 
either underdeveloped or virtually non-existent.  
We argue in this paper that the business model of banking in developing countries 
is better approximated by the traditional financial intermediation paradigm in a strict sense, 
where banks are financial intermediaries that are mainly involved in the transformation of 
deposits (input) into loans (output).
2 Stylized facts summarized in Table 1 for both OECD 
and non-OECD countries include the ratios of stock market capitalization to Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP) and of bank-provided domestic credit to GDP. The figures reveal that, 
over the past decade, the size of the stock market relative to the economy is, on average, 
smaller in non-OECD countries than in OECD nations. In developed capital markets, a 
wide spectrum of debt and equity instruments is available, whereas in developing countries 
there are fewer savings options for storing wealth outside of banks. In other words, banks 
in developing countries are likely to exercise oligopsony power as buyers of customer de-
posits. On the lending side, banks in developing nations also dominate the credit market, as 
the small size of capital markets is indicative of subdued fund raising activity by corpora-
                                                 
1 See Allen and Santomero (1998) for an excellent overview of secular changes in US financial intermedia-
tion structure.  
2 Throughout the text, we use the terms non-OECD and developing countries interchangeably. Walid Marrouch and Rima Turk-Ariss 
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tions. Moreover, bank-provided domestic credit relative to GDP is less than half the ratio 
for OECD countries, again pointing to the under-provision of lending that is typical of oli-
gopolistic behavior in the loan market. 
 
Table    Roles of banks and stock market in financing the economy 
The table gives the ratios of stock market capitalization to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and domestic 







Stock market capitalization / GDP 
   
Domestic credit provided by banks / GDP 
   
 
Source: Authors‟ calculations from International Financial Statistics database. 
 
To help assess the extent of financial disintermediation in developing countries, Figure 1 
illustrates the relationship between the number of banks and the ratio of stock market capi-
talization to GDP. The number of banks positively correlates with stock market capitaliza-
tion, but most observations lie close to the origin, pointing to weak evidence of disinterme-
diation  across non-OECD countries.  When stock markets  are small or nonexistent, the 
number of banks is also usually small, supporting the assumption of the presence of oli-
gopoly in banking in developing countries. 
 
Figure    Financial disintermediation, 2000-2009 
The figure illustrates the relationship between number of banks and the ratio of stock market capitalization to 
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Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/ 2012 
 
 
  7 
Thus, individuals with excess funds in developing countries have limited financial invest-
ment options outside of the banks, and borrowers' recourse to funding is also largely via 
banks. The banks are the main buyers of deposits from depositors and the main sellers of 
loans to borrowers, which gives them considerable market power in both the deposit and 
loan markets.
 As a result, banks‟ behavior in developing nations is more akin to oligopsony 
in the deposit market and oligopoly in the loan market, so that the market structure is best 
described in the main as an oligopsony-oligopoly. The study of an oligopsony-oligopoly 
banking market in an input-output framework is analyzed by Van Hoose (2010) who also 
discusses the implications of three other market structures (perfect competition, monopoly-
monopsony, and monopolistic competition)
3 for the joint operation of banks in the deposit 
and loan markets.
4 
In this paper, we acknowledge joint rent extraction in both deposit and loan mar-
kets and develop a generic model of bank pricing under oligopsony-oligopoly based on 
financial intermediation theory but without explicitly modeling a cost function. We focus 
on pricing decisions because they are crucial to the conduct of banking and because the 
loan rate also serves as a major screening device.
5 Our model enables a theoretical break-
down of the loan rate based primarily on the interaction between the choke price of loans, 
the number of banks in the industry, the probability of loan repayment or loan uncertainty, 
the deposit rate, and the efficiency of transforming deposits into loans. 
In considering both deposit and loan markets, our model is consistent with the 
standard theory of financial intermediation and with real-world banking. The theoretical 
model of Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) demonstrates that focusing on deposit market com-
petition and ignoring the loan market will give an incomplete picture of banks‟ market 
power. Similarly, the applied multimarket competition study by Park and Pennachi (2009) 
shows that bank operations have disparate effects in the deposit and loan markets.  
Our pricing model is a variant of Van Hoose‟s (2010) model of the bank under 
oligopoly-oligopsony that employs a Cournot-Nash framework in order to model the mark-
                                                 
3 See Chapter 3: Alternative Perspectives on Bank Behavior, p. 27-51. 
4 Alternative frameworks for analyzing bank behavior include Ho and Saunders (1981) who model the role of 
banks as dealers between providers and users of funds. Their so-called integrated theory rests on banks‟ abil-
ity to match the random arrivals and departures of deposits and loans, respectively, and which allows banks 
to set the interest rate margin or spread.  A strand of literature on the determinants of bank interest margin 
followed Ho and Saunders (1981). See, for example,  Allen (1988), Wong  (1997), and Angbazo  (1997), 
among others. 
5 High interest rates on loans may attract high risk borrowers (adverse selection effect) or induce borrowers 
to undertake riskier projects (moral hazard effect); see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Walid Marrouch and Rima Turk-Ariss 
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up (mark-down) on loans (deposits) vis-à-vis the bank‟s marginal cost. We additionally 
capture uncertainty in banking via the probability of loan repayment and study its impacts 
on the equilibrium outcomes. We then test our structural pricing model under dual market 
power using longitudinal data on banks in   non-OECD countries over the period 2000-
2009.
6 
We identify two main components to loan pricing under oligopsony-oligopoly that 
are based on theory: a rent extraction component resulting from interaction between choke 
price of loans and the prevailing banking structures, and a mark-up on deposit funding 
costs that captures the transformation efficiency of financial intermediation. Our empirical 
findings indicate that both market structure under uncertainty and the deposit rate are key 
determinants of pricing in non-OECD countries. We also find that the role played by the 
rent extraction share in pricing dominates, on average, funding costs in developing coun-
tries, underpinning the importance of market structure in bank pricing power. 
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 lays out a model of financial 
intermediation for non-OECD countries. Section 3 introduces the empirical specification of 
the structural model and the estimation method. Section 4 presents the data and discusses 
the empirical findings. In section 5, we run a series of validity checks. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2  A model of financial intermediation  
 
2.1  Oligopsony-oligopoly 
 
In this section, we consider a generic model of banking focused on the financial interme-
diation role of banks whose primary function is collecting customer deposits and making 
loans to borrowers. Our analysis is guided by the stylized facts presented in the introduc-
tion about the business model of banking in non-OECD countries. 
We assume that the banking industry is an oligopsony-oligopoly comprising   
symmetric banks operating simultaneously in the deposit and loan markets. For a given 
bank   and any time period, its customer deposits are assumed to be the only source of 
                                                 
6 We believe that coverage of the financial crisis (2008 and 2009) does not bias our findings since banks in 
non-OECD countries were generally less affected by the 2008 global crisis than were those in OECD econo-
mies. In the validity checks section, we exclude years 2008 and 2009 but get the same main results. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/ 2012 
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funding and also the sole determinant of the bank's ability to make loans to borrowers. In 
other words, 
 
   
Where is a production efficiency factor that captures the bank's ability to transform 
its sources of funds (mainly deposits,   at bank  ) into productive uses (loans,   gener-
ated by bank  ), in line with the core financial intermediation function of banks.
7 In what 
follows, we refer to   as the indicator of financial intermediation transformation efficiency. 
Let  and be respectively the total quantity of deposits and loans in 
the  market.  Given  (1),  we  define .  In  the  input  market,  each 
bank faces an upward-sloping market supply of deposits given by 
 
  (  
Where   is the interest rate paid on deposits by the banking sector, and   a positive 
parameter representing the slope of the inverse supply function. 
In the output market, all banks face a downward-sloping market demand for loans given by 
   
where   is the interest rate on loans charged by the banking sector;   is the choke price 
of loans, i.e. the rate at which loan demand is zero; and   is a positive parameter represent-
ing the absolute value of the slope of the inverse demand function.
8 
In line with the banking literature, we assume that on the funding side, deposits 
are insured (explicitly or implicitly), so that their supply does not depend on risk. On the 
lending side, loans to entrepreneurs are risky and are subject to default. Banks offer stan-
dard debt contracts with repayment probability   and probability of default  , in 
which case bank revenues are normalized to zero.
9 The expected profit of bank  , to be 
maximized, then becomes: 
 
   
                                                 
7 For this reason, we abstract from modeling equity and investment in risk-free securities in equation  . 
8The linear demand function allows us to model explicitly the choke price of loans, the importance of which 
is revealed in the next sections. 
9 The model assumes that the recovery rate on risky loans is zero, i.e. that loss given default equals 100%. Walid Marrouch and Rima Turk-Ariss 
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Solving simultaneously for all the best-response functions under a symmetric equilibrium, 
















Table   summarizes the comparative statics for equilibrium quantities and prices in both 
the deposit and loan markets.  
 
Table    Equilibrium quantities and prices 
The table gives the results of comparative statics for equilibrium quantities and prices. 
 
           
           
           
           
           
 
Faced with an increase (decrease) in the demand for loans (increase in   or decrease in  ), 
a representative bank responds by increasing (decreasing) its deposits and loans, which 
raises the price of deposits or loans. However, an increase in the supply of deposits (de-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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  11 
crease in  ) will not have an identical effect across deposit/loan quantities and prices. A 
positive (negative) supply shock in deposits increases (decreases) quantities and reduces 
rates on deposits and loans. An increase in bank's transformation efficiency will increase 
the amount of loans supplied and result in a lower price, notwithstanding an indeterminate 
effect in the deposit market. An increase in the probability of loan repayment lowers the 
price of loans and enables the bank to extend a greater volume of credit. Under this sce-
nario, the bank‟s reputation is also improved and it is able to attract more deposits, albeit at 
a higher cost. 
Further examination of equilibrium outcomes enables us to derive a pricing rela-
tionship that links the deposit and loan markets. Using   and  , simple manipulation of 




Equation   depicts a theoretical pricing structure for the banking industry under oli-
gopsony-oligopoly that entails joint rent extraction in the deposit and loan markets. It also 
enables a theoretical breakdown of the loan rate, which is primarily determined by the in-
teraction between the choke price of loans  , the number of banks  , the probability of 
loan repayment or loan uncertainty  , the deposit rate  , and the transformation effi-
ciency  .  
 
 
2.2  Market spectrum 
 
When we set  we have a monopsony-monopoly ( ). From   and   we get the 
monopsony-monopoly amount and price of deposits, respectively 
 
From   and   we obtain the monopsony-monopoly amount and price of loans, respec-
tively 
 Walid Marrouch and Rima Turk-Ariss 
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When  pure competition ( ) prevails jointly in the deposit and loan markets, lead-




Interestingly, the probability of repayment   does not appear in the equilibrium outcomes 
above, suggesting that uncertainty has no role under joint competition.  
We rank quantities and prices in the deposit and loan markets using the range of 




In the loan market, 
, 
. 
Comparing prices across markets, we obtain the ranking 
 
 
This ranking indicates that the rate on deposits is always lower than the rate on loans re-
gardless of the market structure. A monopsony-monopoly will pay the lowest possible rate 
on deposits and reap the highest rate of return on loans, thereby resulting in the widest pos-
sible spread  between rates. As competition increases, however, the spread nar-
rows down to a minimum of  under joint competition. Furthermore, comparative 
statics on the spread   indicate that a decrease in repayment probability   or a 
higher probability of default will translate to a wider interest rate margin. As loan repay-
ment uncertainty increases, banks will compensate the higher risk exposure by charging a 
larger spread.  
 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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3  Empirical specification 
 
3.1  The structural model 
 
We next test the empirical validity of the structural pricing model of equation (8). For each 
observable variable, we introduce subscripts  for country and   for time and in our sto-
chastic structure:  
 
.   
Here,   and   denote the prevailing loan and deposit rates, respectively, in the banking 
industry of country  ;
10   represents the number of banks;  is the probability of loan 
repayment;    and   are parameters to be estimated reflecting the choke price of loans 
and the transformation efficiency of the banking industry, respectively; and   
is a random error term where   captures unobserved country heterogeneity.  
The structural model of equation  suggests that the equilibrium loan rate in the 
banking  industry  can  be  decomposed  into  two  parts,  a  funding  cost  component 
  and a  rent  extraction  component , where   
gives the prevailing banking structures, which reflect the interplay between   and  . In 
setting the loan rate, the banking industry first covers the funding costs associated with col-
lecting deposits and transforming them into loans. Funding costs are incremented by a rent 
extraction component that augments the choke price of loans   by the interplay between 
uncertainty   and the number of banks in the industry  . These two components 
must be positively additive by construction. Therefore, we also expect the estimates of pa-
rameters   and   to be positive, implying that the loan rate  is increasing in both 





                                                 
10 More precisely, subscript   denotes banking industry in country  . Walid Marrouch and Rima Turk-Ariss 
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3.2  Estimation method  
 
A standard methodology for estimating equation   would assume the same vectors of 
covariates   and   for all countries using either fixed or random effects. Differently 
stated, the standard regression estimations generally focus on mean covariates across coun-
tries and how they change over time.  
However, we opt not to use either fixed or random effects for both economic and 
statistical reasons. First, fixed or random effects estimations “do entail the not entirely 
plausible assumption that there is no parameter variation across [countries]” (Greene, pp. 
318-19, 2003). Our structural model of equation   is country-specific, and it is unrealis-
tic to assume that economic conjectures (captured by  ) and technological conditions (af-
fecting ) are similar across  countries.  Therefore, estimating mean values  for choke 
price and transformation efficiency across all countries lacks an economic rationale. Sec-
ond, assuming either fixed or random effects necessitates imposing a constant term in the 
formulation of equation  , since unobserved country heterogeneity would be statistically 
captured by an intercept. However, adding a constant term modifies equation   and is 
inconsistent with our objective to empirically validate the pricing structure in equation   
in a strict sense. In what follows, we take particular care not to incorporate any exogenous 
or control variable that is not necessitated by our theoretical model.
11 
We, therefore, model parameter heterogeneity across countries as stochastic varia-
tions around their mean values using a random coefficient model (RCM) to estimate   
and   in a reformulation of the structural model  : 
 
.   
Denoting  ,    with    and 
 
 
The RCM accounts for the peculiar economic features of each country in our sample and 
generates country-specific choke prices of loans and transformation efficiency. Typically, 
economic  conditions  differ  across  countries  and  are  likely  to  result  in  different  choke 
                                                 
11 We nonetheless estimate our structural model using both fixed and random effects, to check for robustness; 
the results are available upon request. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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prices of loans.  Similarly, the use of technology in banking is disparate across countries 
and implies different levels of transformation efficiency. Swamy (1970) and Swamy and 
Tavlas (1995) discuss the rationale for RCM, which has been used successfully on a range 
of macro and micro economic applications, including interest rate-budget deficit equations, 
money demand, exchange rate, behavior of share prices, and farm machinery investment.
12  
 
“The motivation for using the procedure is that in cases in which specifica-
tion errors […] are present, it is unreasonable to expect all the „noise‟ to 
affect only the disturbance term in an equation. The noise should affect all 
the coefficients in the equation, and the more noise there is, the greater 
would be the expected impact on all coefficients. Furthermore, while fixed 
coefficients cannot usually be interpreted as direct effects, random coeffi-




4  Data and empirical findings 
 
4.1  Data 
 
We use annual data on loan, deposit, and GDP growth rates for all non-OECD countries in 
 from the International Financial Statistics database.
13 Equation   also 
requires the number of banks   per country per year as well as a proxy for the probabil-
ity of loan repayment or uncertainty in the industry  . To generate these variables, we 
retrieve data on all banks that operate in non-OECD countries from the Bankscope data-
base provided by Bureau van Dijk and Fitch Ratings.
14 The varying number of banks over 
the years points to entry, exit, and merger activity. To obtain the probability of loan re-
payment, we generate a proxy for the probability of default or   as the ratio of loan 
impairment charges to gross loans for the banking industry per country per year and so 
compute  .
15 
                                                 
12 For more recent applications of the RCM, see O'Brien and Berkowitz (2005), Cole (2005), and Smith and 
Tasiran (2010). 
13 In our sample of non-OECD economies, four countries joined the OECD in 2010, Chile, Estonia, Israel, 
and Slovenia. We keep these countries in our sample because they were not part of the OECD in 2000-2009. 
14 The total number of banks is  . 
15 We generate another proxy for   using the ratio of reserves for impaired loans to gross loans, for 
checking validity. Walid Marrouch and Rima Turk-Ariss 
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Our original sample includes   developing countries, but it is reduced to  countries 
due in each case to either missing data on key variables or too few observations for the 
study period.
16 Table 3 gives descriptive statistics on our variables of primary interest in 
equation  . The lending rate dominates the deposit rate across all percentiles, empiri-
cally validating the finding of section 2.2 on the existence of a positive spread, on average, 
in the banking industry. The average number of banks is about , and the median number 
of banks is only 9, lending support to our hypothesis on the prevalence of oligopsony-
oligopoly in banking in the non-OECD countries.
17  
 
Table    Descriptive statistics across   non-OECD countries,   
The table displays descriptive statistics on key variables of equation ( ).   is the number of banks;   the 
probability of loan repayment;   and   the deposit and lending rate, respectively, expressed in percen-
tages;   denotes banking structure, which reflects the interplay between   and  . 
 
         
 
Mean  18.55  0.9385  6.99  15.95  0.1563 
Std deviation  61.21  2.3039  4.92  9.46  0.1489 
25
th percentile  4  0.9775  3.53  9.46  0.0525 
50
th percentile  9  0.9889  5.72  14.02  0.1042 
75
th percentile  19  0.9948  9.33  19.48  0.2083 
 
Further, of all the variables considered, only the number of banks   and the probability 
of loan repayment   have a standard deviation much larger than the respective average 
value. However, the interplay of these two variables in the term   produces 
much less variability in banking structures across developing countries.  
 
 
4.2  Empirical findings 
 
We first show the results for the mean RCM estimates across all countries in Table   fol-
lowing the pricing structure of equation  . In our sample, we identify   countries 
where the number of banks exceeds , and which are likely to bias our findings.
18 Some 
                                                 
16 Among the excluded countries are Angola and Zimbabwe, which experienced hyperinflation during our 
study period. 
17 Interestingly, in the fitted line of Figure 1, when the ratio of market capitalization to GDP is zero, the pre-
dicted average number of banks is 8.24. 
18 These countries are Argentina, Brazil, China, Croatia, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Panama, Rus-
sia, and Ukraine. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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of these countries (e.g. Russia and Ukraine) rely heavily on borrowing from abroad thereby 
breaking the link bethween the domestic deposit base and domestic lending. To avoid such 
bias, we run regressions for the entire dataset (Model  ) and when excluding these 11 
countries (Model  ). 
 
Table    RCM regression results for structural pricing model 
Random effects regression results for equation . The dependent variable is the loan rate per country per 
year;   is the number of banks per country. Banking structures denote the first component of equation (10), 
which reflects the interplay between number of banks and loan uncertainty; its estimated coefficient is the 
average choke price of loans for all countries. The coefficient in the deposit rate is the estimated inverse of 
the transformation efficiency. Model  uses the entire dataset and Model   excludes 11 countries with many 
banks. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at  ; ** significant at ; *** significant 
at  
 
  Model    Model   
Banking Structures 
   
  
   
Deposit Rate 
   
  
   
Observations 
   
 
 
The results of our structural estimation indicate that both banking structures and the de-
posit rate are highly significant at the   level. The results are consistent across both the 
full dataset and when countries with many banks are excluded. Under conditions of uncer-
tainty, the coefficient of banking structure  , i.e. the average choke price of loans for 
non-OECD countries, is significant at the   level; it takes the value   in Model   
and just   in Model  . As predicted in section 3.1, the coefficient   is positive, 
and it also exceeds one, suggesting that the total costs incurred by banks in transforming 
deposits (input) into loans (output) are, on average,   times the deposit cost of funds in 
Model  . This markup on   captures implicit factor costs other than the cost of funding 
deposits, which are not directly accounted for in our theoretical pricing model and which 
might include the input costs of labor and capital. It also reflects the prevailing technology. 
Interestingly, the model captures the costs of financial intermediation implicitly and obvi-
ates the need to formulate an explicit cost function. Further, the value of the   coeffi-
cient  implies  that  the  average  transformation  efficiency    for  all    countries  is 
.
19 On average, every dollar of new deposits funds   cents in loans. A value of   
                                                 
19 The figure   is the inverse of the estimated coefficient,  . Walid Marrouch and Rima Turk-Ariss 
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between    and    is  consistent  with  the traditional financial intermediation function of 
banks in non-OECD countries, where loans are mainly funded by core deposits rather than 
non-deposit liabilities such as money market funds and subordinated debt.  
We also explore which of the two components of the pricing structure is dominant 
in non-OECD countries, the rent extraction component or the funding costs component.  
As in section  , we generate the average rent extraction as the product of estimated 
choke price and the mean value of banking structure. We also compute average funding 
costs as the product of the estimated inverse of transformation efficiency and the mean 
value of the deposit rate. Table   displays the average component shares of the rent extrac-
tion and funding costs in our pricing structure.  
 
Table    Component shares of pricing structure 
Rent extraction is the product of the estimated choke price and the average value of banking structure. Fund-
ing costs is the product of the estimated inverse of transformation efficiency and the average value of the 
deposit rate. Model  uses the entire dataset and Model   excludes 11 countries with many banks. All figures 
are in %. 
 
Component Shares  Model 1  Model 2 
Rent Extraction     
Funding Costs     
Total     
 
The values of choke price and the inverse of transformation efficiency are from Table  . 
From Table  , we obtain the mean values of banking structures ( ) and deposit rate 
 for the full sample (Model  ) and the corresponding values for the reduced sample 
of Model  ,   and  , respectively. It is evident from Table   that the rent extrac-
tion component accounts for the largest part ( ) of the loan rate, and its share be-
comes more striking ( ) when we exclude countries with many banks. This finding 
constitutes evidence of the importance of market structure for bank pricing power under 
uncertainty.  
Finally, the RCM allows us to empirically estimate for each individual non-OECD 
country the choke price of loans and the transformation efficiency of financial intermedia-
tion. We report the results in Table   and their percentile distribution in Table   BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Table    RCM individual country estimates of choke price and transformation efficiency 
Individual country estimates for choke price ( , in %) and transformation efficiency   are generated us-
ing a RCM following equation  . * significant at  ; ** significant at ; *** significant at . 
 
Country  Choke Price  Significance  Transformation 
Efficiency  Significance 
Albania  30.41  **  0.7526  *** 
Anguilla  0.70  -  0.5010  *** 
Antigua and Barbuda  14.77  **  0.4916  *** 
Argentina  4.12  -  0.7081  *** 
Armenia  67.85  ***  0.8115  *** 
Aruba  8.67  **  0.5840  *** 
Azerbaijan  70.53  ***  0.8036  *** 
Bahrain  63.29  ***  1.3158  *** 
Bangladesh  114.59  ***  0.8164  *** 
Barbados  18.09  ***  0.7395  *** 
Belize  23.55  ***  0.8222  *** 
Bhutan  35.84  ***  2.0459  *** 
Bolivia  83.13  ***  0.7114  *** 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  40.63  **  0.5374  *** 
Brazil  643.11  ***  0.3338  *** 
Bulgaria  91.04  ***  0.8227  *** 
Cameroon  62.38  ***  0.4524  *** 
Cape Verde  13.08  ***  0.7468  *** 
Central African Republic  18.64  ***  0.5305  *** 
Chad  22.57  ***  0.3964  *** 
Chile  1.41  -  0.5865  *** 
China-People's Rep.  51.20  ***  0.5122  *** 
Colombia  55.90  ***  0.6951  *** 
Congo, Democratic Rep.  245.26  ***  0.5882  *** 
Costa Rica  176.34  ***  0.7030  *** 
Croatia  274.81  ***  1.5539  * 
Djibouti  32.57  ***  4.6500  *** 
Dominica  10.02  ***  0.7168  *** 
Dominican Republic  184.65  ***  0.8745  *** 
Ecuador  65.70  -  0.5301  *** 
Egypt  155.07  ***  1.2680  *** 
Estonia  15.67  ***  0.8731  *** 
Ethiopia  24.05  ***  0.8767  *** 
Gabon  27.61  ***  0.4263  *** 
Gambia  6.05  -  0.5538  *** 
Georgia Rep.  179.85  ***  1.2837  * 
Grenada  21.69  ***  1.0420  ** 
Guatemala  93.64  ***  0.5327  *** 
Guyana  46.91  ***  1.4732  *** 
Haiti  64.70  ***  1.8462  - 
Honduras  89.91  ***  0.7465  *** 
Hong Kong  71.79  ***  0.7513  *** 
Indonesia  411.79  ***  1.3423  *** 
Israel  21.10  ***  0.7387  *** 
Jamaica  11.67  -  0.4835  *** 
Jordan  66.14  ***  1.5553  *** 
Kenya  190.22  ***  0.6332  *** 
Kuwait  14.36  ***  0.8665  *** 
Kyrgyzstan  8.51  -  0.3236  *** 
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Country  Choke Price  Significance  Transformation 
Efficiency  Significance 
Laos  51.06  ***  0.5578  *** 
Latvia  30.79  ***  0.5928  *** 
Lesotho  26.68  ***  0.6794  *** 
Liberia  17.16  ***  0.4771  *** 
Lithuania  49.23  ***  1.4727  *** 
Macau  49.69  ***  1.2019  *** 
Macedonia (FYROM)  56.73  ***  0.8082  *** 
Madagascar  153.85  ***  2.9263  *** 
Malawi  135.93  ***  1.2480  *** 
Malaysia  40.81  *  0.6427  *** 
Maldives  .-  -  -  - 
Malta  11.00  ***  1.0511  *** 
Mauritius  22.28  -  0.5039  *** 
Moldova Rep.   15.04  **  0.8065  *** 
Mongolia  17.71  -  0.5268  *** 
Montenegro  45.18  ***  1.0899  *** 
Morocco  25.29  ***  0.5938  *** 
Mozambique  34.51  ***  0.8259  *** 
Myanmar Union of  1.61  -  0.7058  *** 
Namibia  4.27  **  0.6277  *** 
Nepal  58.15  ***  0.9572  *** 
Nigeria  12.02  -  0.6747  *** 
Oman  33.11  ***  1.4113  *** 
Palestinian Territories  12.44  ***  1.0563  *** 
Panama  214.23  ***  1.1568  *** 
Papua New Guinea  27.23  ***  0.8518  *** 
Paraguay  360.93  ***  1.3477  *** 
Peru  259.34  ***  0.7897  *** 
Qatar  24.59  ***  1.1860  *** 
Romania  157.79  ***  0.7725  *** 
Russian Federation  607.92  ***  0.5190  *** 
Rwanda  19.40  -  0.6878  *** 
San Marino  21.65  ***  0.8238  *** 
Seychelles  3.38  -  0.5506  *** 
Sierra Leone  25.40  -  0.4963  *** 
Singapore  29.74  ***  0.6975  *** 
Slovenia  61.69  ***  1.2249  *** 
South Africa  7.30  -  0.7185  *** 
Sri Lanka  40.04  **  0.7546  *** 
Suriname  11.39  *  0.5737  *** 
Swaziland  31.96  ***  0.9046  *** 
Syria  4.21  **  0.8597  *** 
Tajikistan  40.78  ***  0.7169  *** 
Tanzania  29.63  ***  0.5451  *** 
Thailand  92.52  ***  1.4095  *** 
Trinidad and Tobago  74.24  ***  1.2462  *** 
Uganda  130.61  ***  0.8917  *** 
Ukraine  567.65  ***  1.5903  ** 
Uruguay  0.47  -  0.6115  *** 
Vanuatu  9.66  ***  0.4524  *** 
Venezuela  30.98  -  0.7566  *** 
Vietnam  23.63  ***  0.8076  *** 
Yemen  11.24  -  0.8383  *** 
Zambia  94.52  ***  0.6619  *** 
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Table  . Percentile distribution of individual-country RCM estimates  
 
Percentile  Choke Price  Transformation Efficiency 
p1  0.7  0.3338 
p5  4.12  0.4524 
p10  8.51  0.5010 
p25  17.16  0.5865 
p50  32.84  0.7519 
p75  74.24  1.0420 
p90  184.65  1.4095 
p95  274.81  1.5553 
p99  607.92  2.9263 
 
 
The bulk of individual-country RCM estimates are highly significant and consistent in sign 
with the results in Table  . The averages of the individual estimated RCM parameters are 
for   and   for  , and these figures are in line with the parameters re-
ported  in  Table  4,    and  ,  respectively.  The  estimated  values  of  individual 
choke prices are all positive. The majority of these estimates ( ) also exceeds  , 
which points to reasonable loans rates at which loan-taking ceases. The estimates of indi-
vidual-country transformation efficiency   are between   and   for   of   countries, 
consistent with the traditional financial intermediation paradigm, while values of   that 
exceed   are indicative of higher leverage for a small subset of developing countries.
20 The 
reported choke prices capture various macroeconomic and structural idiosyncrasies at the 
country level and it is no surprise to have large variations in table 6.  A high choke price 
indicates high tolerance to expensive loan taking, while a small choke price points to an 
aversion to loan taking. Both behaviors can be explained by macroeconomic and/or cul-
tural reasons.  
 
 
                                                 
20 The 25 countries where   exceeds the value of   are: Bahrain, Bhutan, Croatia, Djibouti, Egypt, Gre-
nada, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Jordan, Lithuania, Macau, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Montenegro, Oman, 
Palestinian Territories, Panama, Paraguay, Qatar, Slovenia, Thailand ,Trinidad and Tobago, and Ukraine.. Walid Marrouch and Rima Turk-Ariss 
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5  Validity checks 
 
We test the sensitivity of our results using an alternative proxy for the probability of loan 
repayment. From the Bankscope database, we generate another proxy for   as the ratio 
of reserves for impaired loans to gross loans and run the RCM again. We also exclude the 
years 2008 and 2009 from our sample since it might be argued that the global financial cri-
sis might affect our findings. Our main results are maintained. 
Although our objective is to empirically validate the pricing structure in equation 
(8) in a strict sense, without adding any control variable or interactive term to the stochas-
tic specification that is not explicitly spelled out by our structural model, we nonetheless 
run a series of validity checks for completeness. We capture the effect of business cycles 
by including in equation   the growth rates of nominal GDP across time and countries 
and run our baseline regressions again. Alternatively, we use a dummy variable, Recession, 
to capture periods where GDP growth rates are negative. The intuition is that adverse eco-
nomic conditions affect asset returns differently and may change the weights in our de-
composition of return on loans (See e.g. Amihud 2002, Acharya and Pedersen 2005). Fi-
nally, we use fixed and random effects to estimate our structural model.
21 In all cases, our 
results are qualitatively unchanged.  
 
 
6  Concluding remarks 
 
This paper studies bank pricing under the oligopsony-oligopoly market structure that char-
acterizes the banking industry in developing countries. We develop a model where banks 
have a dual role in catering to the savings needs of depositors and to the financing re-
quirements of borrowers. Considering both deposit and loan markets is consistent with the 
reality and the theory of financial intermediation. Using standard optimality conditions, we 
derive a theoretical pricing structure that ties in the loan rate to the number of banks, un-
certainty about loan repayment, the transformation efficiency of deposits to loans, and the 
deposit rate. We test our structural model using data from   non-OECD countries and 
find that both banking structures and the deposit rate are significant determinants of the 
loan rate. We also document that the rent extraction component dominates funding costs in BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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bank pricing under dual market power. Even when we use alternative estimation methods, 
controlling for the macroeconomic environment, our main estimates are maintained and are 
in line with our theoretical pricing formula.  
The novelty of our model is that it abstracts from any explicit exogenous cost 
function for banks, these being typically unobservable or difficult to estimate without re-
strictive (and probably unrealistic) assumptions. We implicitly capture labor and capital 
factor costs in banking using what we label as transformation efficiency in converting de-
posits into loans. Thus, our model is parsimonious, minimizing the number of assumptions 
needed for an explicit formulation of the cost function. Further, our assumption of a linear 
demand function allows us to estimate a country-specific choke price of loans that reflects 
different economic conjectures. 
Future extensions of the bank pricing model could include the development of 
new measures of the degree of market power in the banking industry. The early literature 
on the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm identifies traditional measures of 
concentration as a source of rent extraction, whereas the New Empirical Industrial Organi-
zation (NEIO) literature does not account for market structure and infers firms' conduct 
directly (Degryse et al., 2009). However, NEIO market power measures such as the Panzar 
and Rosse (1987) H-statistic, the conjectural variation measure by Breshnhan and Lau, and 
Lerner indexes are contested measures of competition (Schaffer, 2004) and can be seri-
ously biased (Corts, 1999). Indeed, none of the ad hoc measures currently employed in the 
empirical banking literature is derived under the assumption that banks operate on and ex-
tract rents from two markets simultaneously, the deposit and loan markets. Our bank pric-
ing model, which views banks as institutions that collect savings from depositors and pro-
vide loans to borrowers, is better connected to financial intermediation theory, and it sug-
gests that market structure matters significantly in bank pricing. More importantly, our 
pricing decomposition allows for the estimation of rents at the industry level, which may 
shed light on the competition-fragility debate in banking.  
                                                                                                                                                    
21 The null hypothesis of the Hausman test cannot be rejected at the 1% level, indicating that a random speci-
fication of the structural model is more appropriate than a fixed-effects estimation. In our model, the RCM 
captures such random effects via coefficients that vary across countries.  Walid Marrouch and Rima Turk-Ariss 
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